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MATHEMATICAL INTERPRETATION OF PLATO’S THIRD MAN
ARGUMENT BASED ON THE NOTION OF CONVERGENCE
GEORGE CHAILOS
Abstract. The main aim of this article is to defend the thesis that Plato apprehended the
structure of incommensurable magnitudes in a way that these magnitudes correspond in a
unique and well defined manner to the modern concept of the Dedekind cut. Thus, the notion of
convergence is consistent with Plato’s apprehension of mathematical concepts, and in particular
these of density of magnitudes and the complete continuum in the sense that they include
incommensurable cuts. For this purpose I discuss and interpret, in a new perspective, the
mathematical framework and the logic of the Third Man Argument (TMA) that appears in
Plato’s Parmenides as well as mathematical concepts from other Platonic dialogues. I claim
that in this perspective the apparent infinite sequence of F -Forms, that it is generated by
repetitive applications of the TMA, converges (in a mathematical sense) to a unique F -Form
for the particular predicate. I also claim and prove that within this framework the logic of
the TMA is consistent with that of the Third Bed Argument (TBA) as presented in Plato’s
Republic. This supports Plato’s intention for assuming a unique Form per Predicate; that is,
the Uniqueness thesis.
1. Introduction
In this article I aim to provide an adequate mathematical interpretation of the classical Third
Man Argument (TMA) which is strongly related with the mathematical approach of Plato’s
theory of Forms.
In this section I introduce the problem, and in the second section I present the framework
within which my arguments are based on, and the Main Claim is founded. In the third section
I analyze, defend and eventually provide an adequate proof of the Main Claim. In the fourth
section I present in detail the mathematical concepts and the topological framework within
which my arguments and the main thesis are comprehended and analyzed. In the last section,
summarizing the work done in the previous sections, I briefly present the main conclusions of
my work.
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The literature dealing with TMA, already large in 1954, has become enormous since then and
almost all of the authors have followed Gregory Vlastos, where in his famous paper of 1954 [31]
pointed out that the argument is formally a non sequitur .
The classical TMA appears in the Plato’s dialogue Parmenides 132a1 − b21, and essen-
tially its logic is present in other arguments in Platonic dialogues, such as the TMA version
in Parm.132d1 − 133a6, where it is applied on the ‘Form-idea’ of ‘Resemblance’. I aim to
adequately explain the apparent plurality of Forms (for a certain predicate) that appears in
the TMA and to show that it is compatible with Plato’s thesis for the existence of a single
form per predicate; that is the uniqueness thesis2. For supporting this, I take into account the
Platonic apprehension of fundamental mathematical concepts, the Mathematics developed in
Plato’s Academy as well as Plato’s dialectic.
The Theory of Forms is also a theory of judgment. Judging involves consulting Forms: To
judge that an object x, either a sensible particular or a Form, is F , is to consult the form of
F -ness and to perceive x as being sufficiently like F -ness to qualify for the predicate F . Alan
Code in [5] suggests that the TMA raises an objection to this theory of judgment. I quote:
‘The TMA is designed to reduce to absurdity the claim that it is the consultation of
Forms which enables us to make judgments. It does this by showing that if that were
the case, we would have to perform an infinite number of such consultations to make
just one judgment.’
Since the theory of Forms tries to explain predication, the TMA is also a challenge to it as a
theory of predication. It is evident though that ‘participating in a Form’ is supposed to explain
1Text: ‘...This, I suppose, is what leads you to believe that each form is one. Whenever many things seem to
you to be large, some one form probably seems to you to be the same when you look at them all. So you think
that largeness is one. . . . But what about largeness itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in
your mind in the same way, wont some one largeness appear once again, by virtue of which they all appear large?
. . . So another form of largeness will have made an appearance, besides largeness itself and its participants.
And there will be yet another over all these, by virtue of which they will all be large. So each of your forms will
no longer be one, but an infinite multitude...’. (The translation is taken from Cohen and Keyt [8]).
2Plato’s intention in defending the uniqueness of a Form per predicate was clearly introduced in the Third Bed
Argument , TBA, Republic 597c − d, and is also present in other Platonic texts. The related phrase ‘ἕν ἕκαστον
εἶδος’ in Parm. 132a1 and its relation to the uniqueness thesis is analyzed by Cohen [6], pp.433 − 466. The
uniqueness thesis should be expressed as:
‘There is exactly one Form corresponding to every predicate that has a Form’.
For a different version of the uniqueness thesis and an extensive discussion the reader should consult G. Fine [10].
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predication. And the upshot of the TMA, as was presented by many authors, is that there
is something defective about this explanation: Since trying to explain predication in terms of
the notion of participating in a paradigmatic Form leads to an infinite regress, and hence is no
explanation at all.
In developing and defending my arguments, I shall be consistent with the interpretation of
the presence of a property in a thing , as well as the recurrence of a single property in different
things. According to Scaltsas [26], the things are F by participating in a Form F -ness is the
answer to two different questions that Plato implies in Phaedo 100c9−d8, Parm. 128e6−129a4,
130e5− 131a2, as well as earlier in Meno 72c. The first is ‘Why is a thing F?’ That is, the first
question concerns the predication of F -ness. In Phaedo 100c9 − d8 the forms are introduced as
the causes of things being F 3. The second question is ‘Why are different things similar?’ This
question that appears clearly in Parm. 128e6 − 129a4, 130e5 − 131a2 concerns recurrence of a
single property in different things and considers the quality identity with respect to F -ness.
In this article I defend the thesis that the apparent infinite sequence of Forms, {Fi}
∞
i=0, i ∈ N
4,
that appears by repetitive applications of the TMA, for either explaining predication or making
a judgment that x is F , it is increasing (ascending) and has a (mathematical) limit ; that is,
an attainable least upper bound. In other words, this infinite sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0 converges to a
unique Form F for a particular predicate. Henceforth, lim
i→+∞
Fi = F , where the convergence is
understood as a mathematical one5. This terminating-limit F - Form should be also apprehended
as compatible to the ‘anupotheton arxe¯n’ -‘ἀνυπόθετον ἀρχὴν’- in Republic’s language6, but ap-
plied here for each particular predicate F . Moreover, this F -Form should be also considered
as analogous to the ‘final rung of Diotima’s ladder’ as presented in Symposium 210eff 7. (In
3In Phaedo the Form is also referred as the F itself (74a11 − 12), which is the καθ᾿ αὑτὸ F (74b3 − 4), the
cause (αἰτία) that makes (ποιεῖ) things being F (100c9− d8), or the explanation of something being F .
4where N is the set of Natural Numbers.
5The formal definition of the convergence using the concept of a limit is: ∀ǫ > 0, there is a natural number k0,
such that ||F − Fi || < ǫ, whenever n ≥ k0. The || · || denotes the norm of the vector-topological space in concern.
See also Rudin [24] for the mathematical definitions of the limit and the least upper bound (l.u.b.).
6The term appears in Rep. 509b − 511d, in 510b and in 511b, and shall be interpreted later in the paper.
We do not give any translation, since any translation may lead to a specific interpretation. (In [30] ad.loc. is
translated as ‘the principle that transcends assumption’.) For an extensive analysis of this passage and especially
the concept and the status of this term we refer to Karasmanis [14], [15] and Benson [4].
7We shall see that this approach is compatible with the mathematics of Plato’s academy and Plato’s dialectic.
For an elaborate and comprehensive exposition of Plato’s dialectic see Robinson [25] ch. 6, 7 and 10.
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Symp. the above procedure is developed in the context of a particular Form, namely the Form
of ‘Beauty’.)
Furthermore, I shall argue and justify that the logics of the TMA and the TBA arguments
do not contradict each other; instead they are consistent and mutually complementary. In
this perspective it is necessary to apprehend this terminating F -Form, that is obtained as a
(mathematical) limit of the above infinite sequence, in a somewhat different context than that
of the various {Fi}
∞
i=0 , i ∈ N, in the sequence. This thesis is developed, properly analyzed and
defended in the sequel.
2. Foundation of the Argument
Before proceeding, I shall briefly present the necessary historical background of the problem
for developing and defending my arguments and my thesis.
In the following, the schematic letter ‘F ’ shall serve as a dummy predicate for any predicate
for which there is a Form. (It is typically used in place of predicate ‘large’ that appears in the
TMA). We also note that we shall not deal with any issues related to the so called ‘Imperfection
Argument’8 (as entailed primarily in Rep. 523 − 525, or elsewhere in Platonic dialogues).
Gregory Vlastos, in his famous paper of 1954 [31], pointed out that the TMA is formally a
non sequitur and he investigated the suppressed premises of the argument. There, he proposed
the NI and SP axioms, asserting though that the only explicit premise of the TMA is the
One-over-Many (OM) assumption.
(OMv) If a number of things are all F , there must be a single Form F − ness,
in virtue of which we apprehend [them] as all F .
Vlastos, after the criticism of his first article (especially by Sellars [27]) and a long discussion,
proposed in his second seminal article [32] a revised version of the premise-set for the TMA9.
8 For example this argument does not posit a form even for every property-name; it posits a form for the
predicate large but not a Form for the predicate man. And it supports that we can infer that is a Form of F
only when we have a group that consists of imperfectly F things. Namely, the imperfection argument posits
Forms both for restricted range of predicates and also a restricted range of groups. (For further details on the
‘Imperfection Argument’ we refer to G. Fine’s [10].).
9Sellars observed that Vlastos [31] in stating original NI and SP axioms had used the expression ‘F -ness’ as if
it represented a proper name of a Form. Looked at in this way, SP and NI are defective, in that they contain free
occurrences of the representative variable ‘F -ness’. According to Sellars the defect can be remedied with the aid
of quantifiers. Thus, he proposed instead that ‘F -ness’ be taken to represent a quantifiable variable. This simple
syntactic maneuver removed the remaining inconsistency. The TMA’s premises as Sellars formulated them in [27]
are:
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(OMv2) If any of the set of things share a given character, then there exists a
unique Form corresponding to that character; and each of these things has that
character by participating in that Form.
(SPv2) The Form corresponding to a given character itself has that character
(Self-Predication).
(NIv2) If anything has a given character by participating in a Form, it is not
identical with that Form (Non-Identity).
There was (and still is) a long discussion on the different ways to express Self-Predication (SP)
and Non-Identity (NI) premises-axioms. Here we shall adopt Cohen’s [6], [8] version of them,
and we also allow for a ‘thing’ to be either a sensible particular or a Form. On this revised
version SP and NI are compatible, but the three axioms together are not (see Cohen in [6],
[8]). Furthermore, without the One-over-Many assumption10 the theory becomes incomplete.
According to many authors, and in my point of view, Vlastos was mistaken in supposing that
any version of OM with uniqueness quantifier would reintroduce the inconsistency 11.
To remedy this problem Cohen in [6], motivated by Sellars [27], replaced OM with
One-Immediately-over-Many axiom (IOM) and employed more sophisticated logical machin-
ery. Cohen’s reconstruction required quantifying over sets as well (without essentially refuting
Vlastos’ [32] SPv2 and NIv2 new versions of these axioms). In this new setting Cohen [6]
demonstrated the consistency of the TMA’s premises.
Although I do not refute Vlastos’ [31], pp.439− 440 textual evidence that the TMA assumes
only one Form F per predicate-character, in this article we follow Geach [12], Cohen [6], Cohen
and Keyt [7] and others in allowing for many Forms per predicate-character in the following
context.
We adopt the fact that different things may belong to different levels (see also Cohen [6] p.468,
note 31 and Section 3 of my article) and based on this, from one hand, we allow for many Forms
(OMs) If a number of things are all F , it follows that there is an F -ness in virtue of which they are all F .
(SPs) All F -nesses are F .
(NIs) If x is F , then x is not identical with any of the F -nesses by virtue of which it is F . (Actually Sellars’
original NI axiom is: If x is F , then x is not identical with the F -ness by virtue of which it is F . For a criticism
on Sellars’ original version see Cohen and Keyt [7] at note 9).
10Actually we adopt the Accurately One over Many (AOM) assumption, since we allow for ‘things’ both
sensible particulars and Forms. For details see G. Fine [10] ch. 14.
11This is due since Vlastos had been working in first-order logic with quantifiers ranging over particulars and
Forms. For more information see also Cohen and Keyt [7] p.8 and note 18.
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per predicate, but from the other hand we argue that these Forms create an increasing sequence
that converges to a unique Form (per predicate).
We analyze and defend this thesis, providing the mathematical framework in which this
infinite sequence of F Forms is constructed and it converges-terminates in a unique F -Form (per
predicate). Furthermore, we address possible problems that seem to arise from this approach.
In particular, within this framework, we show that that the logic of the TMA is consistent
with Plato’s intention for the existence of a unique Form per predicate, that is the uniqueness
thesis (see note 2). Plato for defending the uniqueness thesis introduced in Rep. 597c − d the
famous Three-Bed-Argument, TBA. An analysis of the logic of the TBA (see Cohen [6], part
VII) definitely calls for the existence of at most one Form per predicate; even though Plato
meant TBA to defend uniqueness than ‘at most uniqueness’ thesis12. We will also discuss this
in Section 3B.
Our mathematical interpretation is based on Plato’s comprehension of mathematics and par-
ticularly the concepts of apeiron, peras, limit, density and convergence as well as his approach on
incommensurable magnitudes13. Moreover, our approach is consistent with Plato’s philosophy
and his Dialectic theory. In supporting our thesis we provide and properly analyze concrete tex-
tual evidence from Plato’s dialogues, Plato’s commentators such as neoplatonists philosophers
Plotinus and Proclus, as well as the bibliography developed in this area.
We follow Cohen [6] without planning to raise any objections to NIv2 and SPv2 axioms.
Essentially these axioms were accepted also by Cohen[6], Cohen and Keyt [7] and others. In
the sequel we shall also see that a new form of OM axiom (based on a different construction of
TMA), namely the IOM axiom, entails both NIv2 and SPv2 axioms. We note that it is not the
purpose of this paper to discuss any issues regarding different interpretations of the SP axioms
such as Broad Self Predication, Narrow Self Predication, or Pauline Predications14.
12For an elaborate treatment of the uniqueness thesis consult G. Fine [10] pp 117, 189 − 190, 231. For its
relation to TBA see [10] pp. 235−238, and to TMA see [10] pp. 204, 208−211. Also W.K.C. Guthrie [13], p.552,
provides another explanation for Plato’s need to support the uniqueness thesis. ad.loc.
13 I am not going to accurately translate the terms peras (πέρας) and apeiron (ἄπειρον) since any translation
is an interpretation. My purpose is to understand the meaning and the characteristics of these terms by the
analysis provided mainly in Section 4. In general, apeiron should be understood as infinite or unbounded, related
to incommensurability , and peras as rather the definite or discrete, related to commensurability of magnitudes .
14For an elaborate presentation, analysis and thorough discussion of the different versions and problems re-
garding predication we refer to G. Fine [10], ch. 4 and notes 76 and 80. For Pauline Predications see also Vlastos
[33].
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It is rather worth noting that the Self-Predication and Self-Participation are completely dif-
ferent concepts. That is, Self-Predication (SP) tell us that: F−ness is F , or in other words, is
predicated as being F .
As for NI axiom we interpret it in the sense that:
‘The Form by virtue of which a set of things are all (predicated as) F is not itself a member
of that set. Equivalently, nothing is F by virtue of participating in itself.’
Henceforth, the NI axiom, if we adopt that participating in F−ness is supposed to explain
being F , tells us that we can not explain a thing being F by appealing to this very thing. In
this sense NI should be more accurately phrased as Non-Self-Explanation (NSE) axiom.
We state the versions of SP and NI axioms (slightly modified from NIv2 and SPv2) that we
adopt.
Definition 1
(SP): The Form by virtue of which things are (and are judged to be) F is itself F .
That is: F-nessi is F , i ∈ N.
(NI): The Form by virtue of which a set of things are all F is not itself a member of that set.
Equivalently, nothing is F by virtue of participating in itself, or nothing is explained being F
by appealing to this very F .
That is: F-nessi does not participate in F-nessi, i ∈ N.
In the sequel, for constructing the TMA we adopt Cohen’s approach as developed in [6]. Our
definitions are given in terms of a single undefined relational predicate, ‘participates in’. The
schematic letter ‘F ’, which shall serve as a dummy predicate, will play the role that ‘large’ plays
as a sample predicate in the TMA. We note that almost universally it is assumed that Plato
intended the TMA to hold for any predicate for which there is a Form; hence the letter ‘F ’ is
typically used to express this generality.
Definitions 2:
(D1) By an F -object (object for short), we mean any F -thing; anything that is, whether a
particular-sensible thing (αἰσθητὸ) or a Form (ἰδέα), of which ‘F ’ can be explained.
(D2) An F -particular (hereafter ‘particular’ for short) is an object in which nothing can
participates in. That is a sensible thing (αἰσθητὸ) in Plato’s terminology.
(D3) A Form is an object that is not a particular.
Cohen’s analysis of the TMA clearly aims to exploit an analogy of the TMA with number
theory. It suggests that Plato’s infinite regress of Forms (as in the TMA) is analogous to
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the generation of the infinite sequence of Natural Numbers (N) according to Peano axiomatic
construction. It is crucial to state that Peano’s axiomatic foundation of N (using the concept of
successors) is compatible with Plato’s infinite sequence of Forms as well as with the theory of
Numbers as developed in Plato’s academy15.
Cohen’s TMA construction16 is in accordance and have counterparts with the standard Von
Neumann set-theoretic construction, that corresponds to the definition of N via Peano’s Pos-
tulates. The only premise that the TMA seems that does not have an immediate counterpart
among the Peano’s Postulates is OM. Since OM’s role is to generate a new Form at each stage
of the regress, its number-theoretic counterpart could be the successor function which generates
the members of the infinite sequence of N. Thus, should OM be appropriately modified, it could
be considered as operating for deriving the principle of Mathematical Induction. Specifically,
if OM is to have a uniqueness quantifier, then it will need to be based on something stronger
than Plato’s over relation. Cohen [6] and Cohen and Keyt [7], understanding this and using
Plato’s over relation in the new version (IOM) of OM axiom, adequately define and justify the
immediately-over function that corresponds to the successor function:
Immediately-Over Function
y is immediately over x =df y is over x, and there is no z such that y is over z and z is
over x.
It is worth mentioning that the immediately-over function is a function only with respect to
a single sequence of F -Forms. That is, one F -Form is ‘immediately over’ another, if no third F -
Form intervenes between the two17. Cohen’s One-Immediately-Over-Many axiom, which entails
OM -axiom, guarantees that every Form, in a certain sequence of Forms, has a unique successor .
(IOM-axiom) For any set of F ′s, there is exactly one Form immediately over that set .
This axiom blocks self-participation, since it entails that Forms do not belong to the sets
they are over; thus, the axiom NI is built in IOM-axiom. In addition, SP (as in Definition 1)
15For example, Plato considers that number 2 (as a Form) is not the result (or identical) of summation 1 + 1,
neither the result of the division of a magnitude in two parts (Phaedo 101c); it is should be considered as the
successor of 1. See also Cohen and Kyet [7], Fowler [11] and Taylor [29] ch. 20.
16For the development of Cohen’s construction see [6] pp.461− 467 .
17The immediately over definition can also be defined in terms of the over relation, the notion of the level of
an object and the definition of the maximal set, as in Cohen [6]. Here we use an equivalent one as stated in R.
Patterson in [20], p. 54. The equivalence of the two definitions is also proved by by R. Patterson in [20].
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is presupposed as well, because the values of the variables in the definition of immediately-over
function have been restricted to objects that are F .
Specifically, Cohen’s construction essentially forms an increasing sequence {F −nessi}, i ∈ N,
of F -objects. There, every object F − nessi, in short Fi, defines a level i
18. His construction is
in accordance with Von Neumann set-theoretic one19. Henceforth, the infinite sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0
becomes:
F0 →֒ P
F1 →֒ P ∪ {F0}
F2 →֒ P ∪ {F0, F1}
F3 →֒ P ∪ {F0, F1, F2}
etc.
In the above, P denotes the set of F particulars and →֒ denotes a one to one relation pairing
a Form with the set of its participants20. Now using the symbol ∈ to represent participation
rather than set-membership, we obtain the infinite increasing sequence:
(⋆) P ∈ F0 ∈ F1 ∈ F2 ∈ F3 ∈ ... ∈ Fk ∈ ....
In our thesis we will deviate (somewhat) from the strict N analogy. Namely, we adopt the
above infinite sequence by equipping it with a certain topology . Under this new perspective we
establish our main result as given in the following claim. The proof of the claim is mainly
presented in Section 3.
Main Claim:
(a) For every predicate F there exists a countable increasing sequence of F -objects,
{Fi}
∞
i=0, as in (⋆).
18See note 16.
19Recall that in the Von Neumann construction each member of N is a member of all its ‘descendants’. This
fact and the Peano’s postulate, stating that ‘no two Natural Numbers have the same successor’, entail that no
member of N is its own successor. The Form-theoretic analogue of this is that no Form in the sequence participates
in itself.
20The symbol →֒ is used instead of the symbol ‘=’ to avoid any conceptual identification with the strict
mathematical notion of equality or identity.
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(b) The infinite countable increasing sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0 from part (a) converges to
a unique F -object (as a limit) under a certain topology.
That is lim
i→+∞
Fi = F .
It is worth noting that the above F -Form, as a limit of the infinite sequence, could be identified
with the unique F -Form, the F -itself for a certain predicate21. Henceforth, it is in accordance
with Plato’s intention for supporting the uniqueness thesis (see the previous discussion and note
12 ad.loc.). Furthermore, since the least upper bound is attained (as being a mathematical limit),
part (b) of our Claim overrules A. Codes’ thesis for the role of TMA as raising an objection to
the theory of judgement (see Section 1 ad.loc.).
The convergence to this limit Form should be understood in the concept of Plato’s academy
mathematics and it must be comprehended in a mathematical framework. We note that Plato
had a good knowledge of Eudoxus’s method of exhaustion for approximating lengths and areas
(see Taylor [29], ch.20, ‘Forms and Numbers’ and Anapolitanos [2]). Plato had also used the
technique of anthuphairesis (ἀνθυφαίρεσις) throughout his work22. In Section 4 (based primarily
on Philebus) we shall provide adequate evidence that Plato apprehended the two different notions
of infinite, namely the countable and uncountable ones, both in relation to commensurable
and incommensurable magnitudes and the concepts of density and the continuum (see also
Karasmanis [16]). In this sense, it is highly probable that Plato had also a good grasp on
irrational numbers.
3. The Defense of the Main Claim and Related Issues
In this section I defend and eventually provide an adequate proof of my thesis as it was stated
in the Main Claim.
I am convinced that Cohen’s TMA version, as presented in the previous section, is closer
to Plato’s apprehension of the theory of Forms and to his inclination to think that while the
One-over-Many axiom yields exactly one Form for the set under consideration at each step,
that principle is consistent with there being more than one Forms over the set with which we
start. More precisely, over the set of F−things just one Form appears or comes into view, even
though it turns out they will appear more in the process (by repetitive applications of the TMA
on the new sets). Our analysis will set the mathematical framework of the above construction,
21In Plato’s language is refereed also as ‘F-itself’, ‘καθ᾿ αὑτὸ’ F (see Phaedo 74b3− 4, 100b5− 7 et.al).
22 For the technique of anthuphairesis consult Fowler [11], pp.322-328, Anapolitanos [2] and primarily Negre-
pontis [19]. These matters are also studied for the needs of our article in Section 4 ad.loc..
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providing essentially a proof of the Main Claim. In addition, within our framework, we address,
analyze and finally resolve some problems regarding the logic of the TMA and its relation to
Plato’s theory of Forms.
It is important to emphasize that if one considers the first time a set S0 of F−things, exactly
one F -Form F0 shall appear immediately over that set, hence there is exactly one F -form. In
the second step, where the TMA is applied on S0 ∪ F0 (the set appeared in the first step and
the Form F0) again one and only one F -Form F1 shall appear immediately over this new second
set. This process continues up to infinitum, thus creating an infinite sequence of F -objects; the
sequence of Forms {Fi}
∞
i=0.
Next I present the crucial arguments that defend the Main Claim. In subsection A I prove
part (a) of the Main Claim and in subsection B the part (b) of it.
A. At this point we have to clarify what is involved in the claim that a Form can be
‘over’ its participants. It is clear that Plato thought of Forms as being on a higher ontological
level than the sensible particulars participated in them. Towards this direction there is a strong
textual evidence in Plato’s work: cf., e.g., Rep 515d, 477ff.; Phdo. 74a, 78d ff.; Tim. 28a, 49e;
Symp. 210a-212b., et passim.
As we have already seen, the TMA seems to extend this notion by assuming, in general,
that a Form is on a higher level than its participants, either these are sensible particulars or
Forms. That is, each new Form that appears in each application of the TMA, see (⋆), is
in a higher ‘level’23, within the Platonic Realm of Forms, than its predecessor and hence its
participants. Mathematically, according to (⋆), it is formed an increasing infinite sequence of
F -objects, {Fi}
∞
i=0.
I defend the above in the grounds that it provides a precise formulation of the logical structure
implicit in Plato’s arguments. The key is hiding in how Plato interpreters the One-over-Many
principle. There is no indication that Plato himself ever tried to restrict the One-over-Many
principle in the way to generate one Form for each predicate but no more than one. We can sup-
port this thesis by recalling Phaedo’s doctrine of the homonymy of Forms and their particulars
as well as the interpretation of the famous formulation in Rep. 596a6 − a7:
‘We are in the habit of assuming one Form for each set of many things to which we
assign the same name’.
23We have to stress that these ‘levels’ do not denote different degrees of existence, since this should be incom-
patible with Plato’s ontological dualism theory.
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According to 596a, if for a set of many things ‘we give the same name’, then on this set the
One-over-Many principle could be applied. Based on this and in relation to the TMA, Cohen
in [6] p.474, argues, and I agree with him, that it seems inevitable that Plato would ultimately
include Forms in sets to which One-over-Many principle is applicable24. Here we must also note
that the wording of Republic 596a does not commit Plato to the existence of a Form to every
predicate25. For Plato may well use the word ‘name’ (ὄνομα) not for every predicate, but for
every name that denotes a property or, as we might say, for every property-name in the sense
of true-correct names as expressed in G. Fine [10], p.304 − 305, notes 44 and 4626.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that Plato’s dialectic, as presented in Rep. 509d− 511e,
as well as in 532d − 535a27, is in the general line of thought of part (a) of the Main Claim.
In particular, Plato in the analogy of Simile Divided Line advances the hierarchical progressing
model of levels that leads to the anupotheton arxe¯n, claiming that the whole procedure is done in
the realm of noe¯sis (νόησις) and precisely in the section of episte¯me¯ (ἐπιστήμη), via the exercise
of dialectic method.
Analogous arguments are advanced in the seminal work of Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s
Parmenides (translated by G. Morrow) and particularly in 879.15 − 28 and more emphatically
in 881.23 − 3328.
It is worth mentioning that in Symposium the concept of ‘Rungs’ of ‘Diotima’s ladder’ and
Plato’s analysis on this support the model of increasing sequence of Forms. There, the procedure
is presented in a detailed and vivid manner where the limit Form F is the one of ‘Beauty’. Of
course there the corresponding convergent sequence {Fi} consists of F -objects that are not
Forms. This fact is not of a major importance since in this paper the references to Symp.
24See note 10.
25For example, in Politicus 262a−e Plato denies that there are forms corresponding to every general term. To
know what Forms there are, we need to known not only what words a language contains, but what the genuine
divisions in nature are.
26This argument is presented clearly in Cratylus 386ff where he seems to use ‘name’ in a more restricted way.
According to Crat., ‘n’ counts as a true-correct name only if it denotes a real property or kind and reveals the
outlines of the essence (οὐσία). G. Fine in [10], pp.112− 113, 304− 305, 315 provides an extensive analysis and a
thorough exposition of these notions, and on what Plato meant by the word ‘name’ (ὄνομα).
27 For an analysis of these passages from Republic and their relation to Plato’s dialectic consult Karasmanis
[14], [15], Benson [4], J. Annas [1] ch 10, 11, as well as Robinson [25] ch. 6, 7, 10.
28We quote: ‘...And from there in turn he will be chasing after unities of unity, and his problems will extend
to infinity, until, coming up against the very boundaries of intellect, he will behold in them the distinctive creation
of the Forms, in the self-created, the supremely simple, the eternal...’ .
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are primarily aiming in clarifying and analyzing the procedure itself as well as the concepts of
density and convergence.
Particularly, Plato in Symp. 210e, among others, states ‘...passing from view to view of
beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent,..’ , noting also that the ascension to the final
Rung, corresponding to the ultimate Form (of ‘Beauty’) itself, has to be done in a ‘correct and
orderly succession’ (ἐφεξῆς ὁρθῶς τὰ καλά). This is even more clear in Symp. 211b− c where the
nature of the ascending procedure to the true-Form of Beauty is analyzed. From this passage
we hold on the phrase ‘ ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον’, ‘as on the rungs of a ladder’, and the
use of the word ‘ἐπανιών’, ‘that ascends’. According to Plato this describes the ‘right approach’
(ὀρθῶς) for ‘almost being able to lay hold of the final true F -Form’ (‘σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ
τέλους’), which constitutes also the ultimate goal and the conclusion of the whole procedure.
There, each rung of the ladder defines a level (in an analogy to (⋆)), where each level is higher
and contains the preceding ones. According to Vlastos [34] the whole procedure moves ‘closer
step by step to the Beauty itself’. We have to state that nothing prevents us from assuming
that the same model holds analogously for all Forms (predicates) and is not restricted only to
the Form of ‘Beauty’.
The ascending procedure described in Symp. could be considered as analogous to the abstract
one presented in Rep.511b, where we hold the phrase ‘οἷον ἐπιβιβάσεις’. This ascending procedure
it is a fundamental one within the Platonic dialectic (see also note 27.).
It is convincing that the previous analysis strongly supports the concept of degrees of hierarchy
among the plurality of Forms Fi, i ∈ N, that appear by repetitive applications of TMA. Thus,
the sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0 (in (⋆)) is justified as increasing.
B. I establish the second part of the main Claim. Thus, I show that the infinite regress
of F -Forms {Fi}
∞
i=0 (for a particular predicate) converges to the unique (terminating) F -Form,
the so called F -itself (καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ‘F ’) for the predicate in concern. Furthermore, I address the
various questions that arise regarding the topological framework of this convergence, as well as
the nature of the limit-Form F and the way it should be understood in relation to the various
Fi, i ∈ N, of the sequence in concern.
I will argue that the TMA model adopted in this article, based in Cohen’s analysis [6], is also
compatible with Plato’s intention that One-over-Many principle (in its One-Immediately-over-
Many version) yields to a uniqueness thesis. In this framework we shall defend that the logics of
the TMA and the TBA are not inconsistent, but consistent and rather mutually complementary.
Thus, the uniquness thesis, that Plato intended to support by introducing the TBA, should be
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apprehended in the context that the unique F -Form is the limit of the convergent sequence
{Fi}
∞
i=0; that is, lim
i→+∞
Fi = F
29.
We have to inform the reader that a different approach on this subject, claiming that the logics
of the TMA and the TBA are rather inconsistent, is presented in G. Fine [10], pp.235− 238. In
defending her thesis, G. Fine also argues that, in this particular case, Plato consistently rejects
the NI axiom.
We stress that Cohen, while examining the consistency and logic of the IOM axiom, discovered
that in order for his IOM axiom to be consistent the set theory his formalization presupposes
cannot include the Principle of Abstraction30:
(∃α) (∀x) (x ∈ α↔ Fx) .
That is, for any predicate F , there is a set α consisting of all and only objects to which that
predicate applies31.
Cohen’s problem was the existence of a universal set of F ’s; that is a highest level set contain-
ing all the F -objects in all (lower) levels. For, if there were such a set (the universal set of F ’s),
the increasing sequence in (⋆), that corresponds to the Von Neumann set theoretic construction
of N, it would contain a maximal element (and hence should not be an infinite one). Of course
this cannot happen, since it contradicts the IOM axiom and the fact that the set N does not
have a maximal element.
Cohen addressed this problem and he stated that if someone wants to retain the Principle of
Abstraction, the IOM should have been somewhat altered (see Cohen [6], note 33).
29This F is the unique Form, as defined in Phaedo, the ‘F itself ’ (74a11 − 12), the ‘F without qualification’
(74bff ), the ‘ ‘F’ that it can never seem non-‘F”(74c1− 3), see also note 3. It is the Form as the final stage of the
ascending procedure described above. In Symp. 211c this F is further understood as the unchangeable end, the
goal, the conclusion of the ascending procedure, ‘αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι’, tangent to the very essence of F -ness.
Similar terminology and way of apprehending this ‘F -itself’ is encountered in many Platonic dialogues, such as
Phaedo et.al . For example in Phaedo 101e it is described as the termination of the ascending procedure to the
one Form which is ‘adequate’, ‘ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις’. The ascending procedure is also developed elaborately
in an abstract manner in Rep.509e − 511d and shall be discussed in the sequel. See also Karasmanis [14] for the
analysis of hypothetical method in this passage.
30It is out of the scope of this article to argue about the intrinsic of the Principle of Abstraction per se. For
the validity and its difficulties see Quine [23], pp. 134− 136, 249, 300.
31This principle should be considered in relation to the axiom schema of comprehension of Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory. The interested reader should also study the nature of this axiom schema and the possible problems
arising by an improper use of it. For details and an analysis we refer to Cori and Lascar [9] pp.112− 113.
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Here we follow a different approach, offering a solution to the problem and retaining the
original version of IOM axiom and the Principle of Abstraction. This is done by claiming that
the increasing infinite sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0 converges within a certain topology; hence there exists
a (mathematical) limit of this sequence. This limit as the attainable least upper bound of the
increasing sequence could be considered as the the ‘highest level set’ containing all the F -objects
in all (lower) levels; thus the Principle of Abstraction is retained. We believe that our approach
is closer to Plato’s theory of Forms and specifically to his intention for accepting the uniqueness
thesis. In the sequel we support this thesis.
Plato in Rep. 597c− d presents the Three Bed Argument and he applies the One-over-Many
principle to eventually prove the uniqueness of the Form (the ‘bed’ in the particular case). But
as analyzed by Cohen [6] and G. Fine [10], the application of the TMA on the TBA what does
really proves is that there is at most one Form of ‘bed’. It is remarkable that in order to conclude
that there is exactly one Form of ‘bed’ we must show that the sequence as constructed, using
repeatedly the TMA, eventually stops. This cannot be done, since the TMA produces infinite
sequence. Thus, the logic of the TMA together with that of the TBA lead to the conclusion
that there are none Forms. Of course this was not the intention of Plato since it contradicts his
Ontological theory.
Here we provide adequate evidence for establishing the proof of part (b) of the main Claim.
This also entails that that the Principle of Abstraction and the IOM are retained, and the
existence of the infinite sequence is proved to be genuine without leading to any contradiction.
In addition, within this context, A. Codes’ thesis that the TMA raises an objection to the theory
of judgement (see Section 1 ad.loc) is overruled. For doing this we argue that the F -Form, the
‘F-itself’, that appears as the limit-terminating point of the above increasing sequence must not
be committed to the Non-Identity (NI) or Non-Self-Explanatory (NSE) axiom .
Indeed, form one hand this F -Form clearly satisfies Self-Predication axiom (since it is predi-
cated as being F ). But from the other hand, it is the limit of the increasing sequence of {Fi}
∞
i=0
and hence there are no further F -Forms beyond this particular F -Form, in contrast with the rest
Fi, i ∈ N, F -Forms in the sequence (⋆). These arguments lead to the conclusion that the limit
F -Form should be comprehended as self explained . Hence it could not satisfy the Non-Identity
(or NSE) axiom.
In the sequel we present how Plato understands and explains the above thesis. For doing this
we study the framework within which he comprehends, in my point of view, the convergence of
{F}∞i=0 to the unique F (for each predicate).
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Of course in order to talk about convergence and limits we must assume a certain topology.
This topology should be the one closer to Plato’s understanding of mathematical concepts.
Plato, as we mentioned in Section 2 and as we shall see in Section 4, had a good grasp on the
Eudoxus’ exhaustion method and the technique of anthuphairesis, as well as an apprehension of
the concepts of peras, apeiron, density and continuum and their relation to commensurable and
incommensurable magnitudes.
The topology we consider, and hence the convergence we are refereing to, is also in accordance
with Plato’s dialectic process (more specifically as presented and analyzed in Rep. 509c − 511e
and 532d − 535a) as well as his apprehension of the fundamental concept of the anupotheton
arxe¯n (ἀνυπόθετον ἀρχὴν) in Republic, but applied here for each particular predicate. In Rep.
510b Plato states clearly that the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire do-
main of episte¯me¯ has been exhausted via the dialectic process. This principle, established by an
exhaustive scrutiny, should be understood as higher than all premises-hypotheses, ‘ὑποθέσεις’.
It is higher, in the sense that contrary to them it has an axiomatic status (playing the role
of a system of axioms), it is non-hypothetical, it is situated in the highest point of the intel-
ligible world (in Republic’s Simile Divided Line) and it does not require derivation32 (see also
Karasmanis [14], [15] and Benson [4], p.190).
We emphasize that mathematically the anupotheton arxe¯n is the ultimate-final unique Form
apprehended as the mathematical limit of the infinite increasing sequence under the presupposed
topology. It must be noted that this Form is comprehended not as a transcendental ontological
mystery but in the mathematical sense of the least upper bound of the increasing sequence of
Forms (see (⋆) and part (a) of the main Claim) that it is eventually attained; hence it becomes a
limit Form. Apart from Republic, it should be apprehended as the one (‘μονοειδὲς’ in Phaedo’s
language) that should be parallelized with the highest-terminating rung of Diotima’s ladder,
which is tangent to the very essence of F -ness33.
Within this framework, this limit-Form could also be conceived as not committed to the Non-
Identity (NI) axiom. This is due for being the F -Form, the anupotheton arxe¯n that in addition
to the above gives an account to all the lower level Fi, i ∈ N, F -Forms, but itself does not
require derivation. In this sense, there do not exist further F -Forms in higher order level(s)
32As argued above even though it is not committed to NI axiom, it is predicated as being F and thus it satisfies
the SP axiom.
33 see Symp. 211b − c where that F is the Form of ‘Beauty’.
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to be depended on, or any Forms for providing an explanation to it34. Thus, the Form in dis-
cussion, though is predicated as F , should be regarded as self-explanatory. In an abstract and
an ontological level this Final stage (this particular limit of the sequence) should be considered
as the unchangeable unique ‘Is’35, ‘εἶναι’, predicated as F and apprehended as the terminating
point-Form of the increasing infinite sequence-process, the process of becoming-gignesthai ( ‘γίγ-
νεσθαι’). This infinite process, using Plato’s terminology, leads to the unconditional, immutable,
objective, unchangeable, perfect and unique ‘Is’.
In Section 4 we present and analyze, mainly within the context of Philebus 23c − 27c, the
mathematical framework of this process. It is the process per se which is compactly phrased at
26d7− 9 as genesis eis ousian- ‘γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν’36. This procedure it can be parallelized to the
dialectic one, that under the cause of noe¯sis exhausts the entire domain of knowledge-episte¯me¯
in order to arrive and terminate to the purest mental state, the unique F -Form. This Form,
as stated earlier, is non-hypothetical (‘ἀνυπόθετον ἀρχὴν’ using Republic’s terminology) is not
committed to NI (better NSE) and has an axiomatic status.
Summarizing, we conclude that the increasing infinite sequence of F -Forms derived by repet-
itive applications of the TMA (for each predicate) converges eventually to a (mathematical)
limit (a terminating point) which is unique (as a limit of a sequence). This is in accordance
to Plato’s intention in supporting the Uniqueness of a Form per predicate. Furthermore, our
thesis is consistent with the Principle of Abstraction in Logic as analyzed earlier in this paper.
At this point we provide further textual evidence supporting the concept of convergence (as
stated earlier) strengthening our arguments in part (b) of the main Claim.
We mention that the notion of the limit , as the terminating point of this infinite but convergent
sequence, as well as the whole theory established above, it is also present in some form or as
parts of it in many Platonic texts (of the middle and late period), such as Symp., Phaedrus, Rep.,
34Strictly, this should be better considered as modal, stating: ‘that there are not required further F -Forms in
higher order level to be depended on, or needed for providing an explanation to it.’ But no harm is done here by
simplifying it as existential, since the TMA shows existence of F -things. Furthermore, in a mathematical-logic
language, this unique Form is not a derivation, or a theorem, but it has the status of an axiom, or of a system of
axioms, and thus it does not require a proof. Moreover, due to its status, all the information of the system can
be retrieved from it .
35In Symp. 211a Plato characterizes this ‘Is’ as: ‘... ever-existent and neither comes to be nor perishes, neither
waxes (growths) nor wanes (declines, decreased)...’. In 211b is characterized as unchangeable and is affected by
nothing. Further, in 211c this ‘Is’ is revealed at the end of the ascending procedure, characterized as the very
essence of the F -ness.
36For an analysis of this passage, as well as the crucial phrase ‘γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν’ we refer also to Section 4.
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Philebus, Epistle 7 et.al . Its distinct status, primarily in Philebus, shall be analyzed in Section
4. In addition, the notion of the limit was adopted and studied by Neoplatonists philosophers
and Plato’s commentators such as Proclus and Plotinus.
More specifically, Plato in Symp. 210e − 211a characterizes the limit Form F , in relation
to the termination of the infinite sequence, as being revealed ‘abruptly, suddenly’-‘ἐξαίφνης’.
In addition he states that it exist unconditionally and is ‘the perfect thing, the wondrous and
beautiful in nature’- ‘θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν’37. Furthermore, in Plato’s Epistle 7.341c
we encounter related notions that emphasize the concept of the upper bound of the infinite
sequence that it is revealed suddenly-‘συζῆν ἐξαίφνης’38. Analogous approach is encountered
also in Plotinus Enneads 43.17.
The statement that the terminating F -Form can be achieved as a limit of the increasing
sequence in themost perfect manner is furthermore emphasized in the process described in Symp.
211a − e. There, it is characterized (in 211e) as ‘the divine beauty itself, in its unique form’-
‘θεῖον καλὸν μονοειδὲς’39, and in Symp. 212a as the tangent-contact to the truth-‘τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
ἐφαπτομένῳ’. In Symp. 211c9 is called the ‘terminating point of the ascending procedure’- ‘αὐτὸ
τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι’40.
Similar ideas about the nature of this ‘limit’, the terminating point-Form, as being the contact
approach and intercourse with the truth is evident throughout the Platonic corpus41.
Very emphatically, the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus in his work Commentary on Plato’s
Parmenides 881, 23 − 3342 analyzes the concepts of infinite (apeiron) regress that arrives to a
terminating mental point/peras-‘νοερὸν πέρας’, via the process of the intellect/noe¯sis-‘νόησις’.
37A similar terminology is used in Phaedrus 250b.
38Epistle 7341c ‘...but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it
is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light...’.
39In Republic 398a this perfect from is characterized as ‘divine and holy ’-‘ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστόν’.
40For an analysis of the passage 201d − 212c in Symposium we recommend Taylor [29], ch 9, section 8 and
Vlastos [34].
41This idea is present and analyzed in many Platonic works and is also frequent in Aristotle and the Neopla-
tonists. The process of arriving to this terminating point that is tangential to the true-Form is analogous to the
one described earlier in Symp. 210eff , Rep. 490b, as well as in Rep. 509c−511d in the context of Plato’s dialectic
theory. (For details see J. Annas [1] and for a meticulous analysis of Rep. 509c − 511d see Karasmanis [15] and
Benson [4]).
42We quote:‘...And from there in turn he will see other more comprehensive unities, and he will be chasing
after unities of unity, and his problems will extend to infinity, until, coming up against the very boundaries of the
intellect, he will behold in them the distinctive creation of Forms, in the self-created, the supremely simple, the
eternal...’. A similar line of thought is present also in Plotinus, Enneads 2.4.15, 15− 16.
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The term ‘νοερὸν πέρας’ should be apprehended as analogous to ‘ἀνυπόθετον ἀρχὴν’ of Republic.
It is the termination, the limit of the dialectic process. This process occurs in the ἐπιστήμη-
episte¯me¯ (the upper part of νόησις-noe¯sis) of the ‘Simile Divided Line’43. In addition, Proclus
in Commentary of the First Book of Euclid’s Elements is arguing, using the concepts of peras
and apeiron (in the line of thought of Plato’s Philebus), in order to establish the convergence
apprehended via the notion of the limit . This approach shall be discussed in some extend in the
next section, where we shall compare and cross-examine it with the one that appears in Plato’s
Philebus.
In the next section we study, in some extend, the mathematical concepts and the general
framework involved and required for establishing our main Claim. Our analysis is based primarily
on Plato’s Philebus and the key notions of peras, apeiron, density and continuum in relation to
commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes.
4. The Mathematical framework of the Argument
I would like to start by arguing that Plato apprehended the structure of incommensurable
magnitudes in a way that these magnitudes correspond in a unique and well defined manner to
the modern concept of the Dedekind cut44. For the precise definition of the Dedekind cut the
reader should consult Rudin [24]45.
Furthermore, it is important to note that Plato captured the notions of density of magni-
tudes and the complete continuum in the sense that they include incommensurable cuts (see
Karasmanis[16] p.394).
It seems that Plato considers incommensurability as an essential feature of magnitudes. This
can be most vividly observed in Philebus 23c− 27e, as well as Theaetetus 147d4− 148b4, where
Plato’s approach to the continuum is developed. In Philebus Plato makes an effort to explore
the relation between continuum, infinite divisibility and incommensurability in contrast with
commensurable things that are capable of appearing in ratios and proportions.
43For further clarification and analysis of these terms we recommend Karasmanis [14], [15] section III (cf . note
3 ad.loc.) and Benson [4].
44This is more clear in the dialogues Theaetetus, Philebus; for details see Taylor [29], ch. 20, Fowler [11], and
Anapolitanos [2].
45In Rudin [24] the Real numbers are constructed as Dedekind cuts in a unique and well defined manner which
follows the line of thought of Eudoxus’ exhaustion method. It is important to note that square roots of non square
numbers, (see Theaet. 147d4 − 148b4), as well as the incommensurable magnitudes could be obtained via the
technique of anthuphairesis, ‘ἀνθυφαίρεσις’. Antuphairesis entails also the concept of ‘cut’ (see Taylor [29], ch.
20) and is presented formally and in great detail in the 10th book of the Elements of Euclid. See also note 60.
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We study the above mathematical concepts and the notions of peras and apeiron46 based
primarily on the passage 23c − 27c of Philebus.
We have to note that in 16b − 19a Plato says that ‘the things that are ever said to be’ (ἀεὶ
λεγόμενα) are made up of one and many , with peras and apeiron inherent (σύμφυτον) in them,
but in the second passage Socrates asserts that peras and apeiron are two different general
classes of things47.
In 23ff Plato makes a fourfold division: peras (πέρας), apeiron (ἄπειρον), mixed (μεικτόν) and
cause (αἰτία). That is how he examines these four categories-classes one by one.
In 23c10−d1 the class of mixed is assumed as a combination of peras and apeiron. Karasmanis
in [16] examines systematically the characteristics of peras and apeiron and attempts to answer
a plethora of questions regarding their nature, their status in the fourfold division and their
relation with the notions of commensurability and incommensurability .
The class of ‘cause’ (αἰτία) is explained in 23d6 − 7 as the cause of the existence of the third
class, that of the mixed. According to Plato this is the cause of the combination (σύμμειξις) of
the other two classes, the peras and the apeiron.
In 23e and 25d11 − e2 Socrates states that he should investigate the mechanism (αἰτία) that
the separated peras and apeiron are mixed together, explaining how are becoming a unity. Plato
in 24c − d explains more accurately what he means by ‘apeiron’ and ‘more and less’, ‘τὸ πλέον
καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον’. He says that wherever the ‘more and less’ are present they exclude any definite
quantity, poson (ποσόν). This passage says that the essential characteristic of the ‘more and
less’ is the absence of any definite quantity, for the presence of definite quantity and measure
(μέτρον) in the place where the ‘more and the less’ is present will abolish the ‘more and the
less’. It seems that according to Plato the notions ‘more and less’ and ‘definite quantity’ are
mutually excluding.
In 24d the notion of continuum is further analyzed. Specifically in 24d4 − 5 Plato uses the
expression ‘προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει’ translating as ‘goes on without pause’ or ‘progressing and
never stationary’; henceforth the notion of a continuous motion is advanced. In the same line of
thought Plato at 31a says that:
46see note 13.
47We must note that this is indeed a problematic passage where the term ‘ἀεὶ λεγόμενα’ are most probably
the ideas-Forms. For a discussion and the various interpretations of the term apeiron in this passage, we refer to
Karasmanis [16] p.390, notes 8, 9. Analogous to this approach, for the so called ontoˆs on-‘ὄντως ὂν’, is advanced
by Proclus in The Elements of Theology , 89.
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‘apeiron in itself does not have and will never have any precisely marked begin-
ning, middle or end’.
Thus, we could assert that what is characterized by the ‘more and less’ should be continu-
ous and, therefore, the characteristics that Plato attributes to the apeiron point to continuous
magnitudes. Such an apeiron as continuous is infinitely divisible; this last property is the main
characteristic of magnitudes. The same idea is also clear in 24e− 25a. In passages 25b and 25e
he talks about the class of peras where he obviously relates that to the class of commensurable
magnitudes (analogously one could relate it to the countable set of rational numbers). Thus, it
seems that Plato suggests that the main characteristic of his peras is commensurability .
We find further evidence for this claim in two other passages from the Philebus:
(a) ‘That of equal and double, and whatever puts an end to opposites being at odds with each
other, and by the introduction of number that makes them commensurate-summetra (σύμμετρα)
and harmonious’, 25d11 − e2.
(b) ‘Again, in the case of extremes of cold and heat its advent removes what is far too
much and apeiron and produces what is measured-emmetron (ἔμμετρον) and commensurable
(summetron)’, 26a7 − 9.
If peras is what makes things commensurate, then apeiron must be the source of incom-
mensurability . I think that Plato here is using the term commensurate-summetron in a rather
technical, mathematical sense. Now, if we agree that Plato says in 24e7−25a2 48 and in 25a6−749
that apeiron admits opposite characteristics to those of peras, then we have to conclude that
incommensurability is a further and very important characteristic of apeiron. It seems then
that Plato relates discontinuity to commensurability and probably (ex silentio) continuity to
incommensurability .
I refer to 26a to stress that according to Socrates, the perfection (in the art of music) or
harmony and moderation (in the case of temperature) can be achieved by properly combining-
mixing the opposite directions of apeiron (see Karasmanis [16], p.391 − 392) and finding the
limit-peras50. This limit-peras within this context is restated (and identified) in 26d8− 9 as the
48We quote: ‘All things which appear to us to become more or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and
excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of the infinite as their unity...’.
49 We quote: ‘... and the things which do not admit of more and less and the like, but do admit of all that is
opposed to them...’.
50We quote 26a2 − 4: ...‘And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the
addition of these same elements creates a limit-peras and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection,
does it not? ... .
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emmetron-measured and summetron-commnsurable51. In 26b Plato generalizes the assertion
that the limit leads to perfection and that is the way to arrive to the realm of Forms (ἰδέες)52.
Now peras gives not just any determination of apeiron but the right one according to specific
case of art. When Plato speaks about apeiron in the framework of mixed and the mechanism
of mixis, it seems that he broadens its meaning. In 26d7 − 9 Plato states:
‘...And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two [peras
and apeiron] which comes into being (γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν), to a stable and immutable
essence, as a result of the limits-measures (μέτρων)53 created by the cooperation of the
the peras54....’
Thus, according to the above passage and to 23d6−7 (commented earlier) peras is drown onto
apeiron via the class of the cause (αἰτία) to create the third class, the class of mixed (μεικτὸν)
according to a specific process. Summarizing all of the above we conclude:
(z) The incommensurability of apeiron can be approximated and eventually be
a limit in a specific manner; that is, by imposing peras, which makes things
commnsurate, on it.
We could further conclude that Plato considers the class of mixed in relation to the unchange-
able perfect ‘Is’55 (εἶναι) which is formed by imposing, with the aid of the class of peras, a limit,
a due measure on the class of apeiron via a specific process. This process that results to the
‘Is’, is characterized in Plato’s language (26d8) as ‘genesis eis ousian’-‘γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν’.
Plato clearly supports the above thesis in other parts of Philebus such as 27d6 − 10:
‘for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which
belong to the apeiron, bound by the peras; and therefore this victorious life (ὁ νικηφόρος
βίος) would rightly (ὀρθῶς) be considered a part of this class.’
For an in depth comprehension of this thesis the translation of the phrase ‘γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν’
in 26d8 is crucial. It is translated as ‘coming into being’, that entails a continuous process,
a creative procedure; it is a becoming that generates and eventually gives rise to something
51See the notes 53 and 54.
52We quote from 26b..‘all the beauties of our world arise by mixture of the apeiron with the peras’ , and he
continues to state that ‘for many glorious beauties of the soul this goddess,... beholding the violence and universal
wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit-peras (see note 54) of pleasures or of indulgence in them,
established law and order, which contains a limit-peras (see note 54)...’.
53Here the word ‘μέτρον’ (measure) should be comprehended as ‘due measure or limit’-‘right proportion’ .
54Here peras should be comprehended rather as ‘that which limits or has limits’. See also Philebus 30a .
55See also the discussion in Section 3 ad.loc..
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stable via the proper-correct way in due measure. In this sense, it leads to the ideal-optimum
‘victorious life’ which belongs to the class of mixed56. At Philebus 55a3, the genesis as the
becoming, the generation, is presented as the opposite of ‘destruction’-‘φθορά’. The word genesis
appears often in Plato. Particularly, in Phaedrus 245e2− 5 is presented as the source of motion
and origin, where the self-motion is comprehended as the essence, ‘οὐσία’. The other term ousia-
‘οὐσία’ is central in Plato’s philosophy. It primarily denotes the essence, the true substance,
the stable and true being, the immutable reality, the einai-‘εἶναι’57. We have to mention that
in Rep.534a2 − 4 Plato claims that the two terms-concepts, genesis and ousia have different
ontological and epistemological status. He emphasizes that doxa (δόξα) is concerned and is
dealing with genesis, while noe¯sis-νόησις is the one that deals with the essence-ousia58. Analogous
interpretation is advanced also in Plato’s Tim. 29c4, cf . Sophist 232c7 − 9.
There is a passage in Proclus’ Commentary of the First Book of Euclid’s Elements which
seems to advance similar ideas, regarding peras and apeiron in relation to commensurable and
incommensurable magnitudes59, and hence it is strengthening our conclusion (z). Although
Proclus does not refer to Plato at all, I find it highly probable that he has in mind our passages
on peras and apeiron in the Philebus, as we have analyzed them above.
‘Mathematicals are the offspring of the limit-peratos (πέρατος) and the unlimited-apeirian
(ἀπειρίαν), but not of the primary principles alone, nor of the hidden intelligible causes,
but also of secondary principles that proceed from them... .This is why in these or-
ders of being there are ratios-logoi (λόγοι) proceeding to infinity-apeiron (ἄπειρον), but
controlled by the principle of the limit-peratos. For number, beginning with unity, is
capable of indefinite increase, yet any number you choose is finite; magnitudes-megethoˆn
(μεγεθῶν) likewise are divisible without end, yet the magnitudes distinguished from one
another are all bounded, and the actual parts of a whole are limited. If there were no
infinity-apeirias (ἀπειρίας), all magnitudes would be commensurable and there would be
56Earlier in 27d1 − 2 this ‘victorious life’ is characterized as the mixed life of pleasure-he¯done¯ and prudence-
phrone¯sis. See also Taylor [29], ch 16.
57In contrast to ‘οὐσίαν’ as the ‘εἶναι’, the ‘Is’, the stable being and the immutable reality, Plato uses in
Theaet.185c9 − 10 the term ‘me¯ einai’- ‘μὴ εἶναι’ .
58For details about the status of these terms we refer to Karasmanis [15] pp.148 − 149 and p.156 section III,
J. Annas [1] ch. 10, 11, and Adams comments in [30] ad.loc..
59Though that in matters of divisibility Proclus does not see the possibility of an infinite divisibility that does
not involve incommensurability, something that Plato probably observed. For an in depth analysis of the notions
of incommensurability and infinite divisibility in Proclus see Anapolitanos and Demis [3].
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nothing inexpressible-arre¯ton (ἄρρητον) or irrational-alogon (ἄλογον) features that are
thought to distinguish geometry from arithmetic.’ (6. 7-22; transl. by Morrow 1970)
Proclus in his works had also systematized material from Platonic dialogues. Specifically, in
his work The Elements of Theology (86.16−20, 24−26) he clearly distinguishes the two types of
infinity (ἄπειρον) that most probably correspond to the ones that are suggested in Philebus and
are analyzed in the sequel. Analogous approach was advanced by Plotinus in Ennead 2.4.15−16.
In relation to the above, Plato in Philebus 27e speaks about pleasure states that it is apeiron
both in ‘quantity and degree’, ‘καὶ πλήθει καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον’. Karasmanis in [16] attempts to provide
an explanation to this, even though he admits that this passage is rather problematic and the
possible conclusions drawn from it are not absolutely certain. In spite of this, he goes on
providing evidence that is highly probable that apeiron in quantity (πλῆθος) is something that
is infinity by addition; that is, this apeiron is not continuous but discrete. Furthermore, the
apeiron in degree (τὸ μᾶλλον) does not have definite quantities; therefore, it is continuous or
infinite by division.
Now we discuss in some extend the concepts of commensurability and incommensurability in
relation to the terms-classes of peras and apeiron.
The incommensurability appears as special case of of infinite divisibility. Plato in Theaet.
147d− 148e presents topics from the theory of incommensurability (see Karasmanis [16] note 16
and Fowler [11]).
To prove that two magnitudes are incommensurable, Greek mathematics use the technique of
anthuphairesis (ἀνθυφαίρεσις) which is used mainly to find the greatest common divisor between
two numbers. The technique of anthuphairesis is presented in Euclid’s Elements as Proposition
X.2 (see also Karasmanis [16] note 21). It is important to state that an infinite anthuphairetic
process of reciprocal subtraction between two magnitudes shows that these magnitudes are
incommensurable. Moreover, a finite-terminating anthuphairetic process shows that these mag-
nitudes are commensurable60.
It is evident that Plato apprehended these results. Specifically, the construction of incommen-
surable magnitudes in Theaet. 147d−148e, as well as the philosophical aspect of anthuphairetic
process in Plato’s dialogues, such as Sophist 264b9−268d5 (see Negrepontis [19]), point to Plato’s
deep grasp of the technique of anthuphairesis and his intention to apply it systematically in a
60For a formal and extensive presentation of the technique of anthuphairesis and the presentation of the proofs
of the results regarding commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes the reader should consult Fowler [11]
(1987 chs 2 and 5), Anapolitanos [2], Knorr [17] (1975, chs 2, 4, 7), and Sinnige [28] (1986, pp. 73− 80).
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general philosophical framework. Thus, taking into account all of the above as well as the inter-
pretation given for the phrase ‘quantity and degree’ in 27e, one could rather safely conclude that
Plato comprehended the two types of infinity , namely the countable and uncountable ones61.
In this way we see that we have two kinds of infinite divisibility that are strongly related to
magnitudes:
(1) the Zenonian infinite divisibility that results to the Aristotelian continuum, which it
points to what we nowadays call the set of rational numbers (see Karasmanis note 4 in [16]).
This is a characteristic of commensurability-noting that commensurable magnitudes have finite
anthuphairesis-and discrete infinity. It could be considered analogous to the type of infinite that
characterizes the set of rational numbers, Q.
(2) Anthuphairetic infinite divisibility which produces the incommensurable and makes the
continuum dense, thus generating magnitudes. It could be considered analogous to the type of
infinity that characterizes the irrational numbers qQ62. We note that by making the continuum
dense we obtain the Real Line R.
Henceforth, supplementing the Aristotelian continuum-which is characterized by Zenonian
infinite divisibility and corresponds to commensurables-with the incommensurables- which are
obtained via the anthuphairetic infinite divisibility- we obtain all magnitudes. The density of
the continuum and hence the construction of the Real Line could be written now (using modern
mathematical terminology) as R = Q∪qQ. Recall also that Q has cardinality N0 and is a
countable set, but qQ as well as R have cardinality 2N0 and hence are uncountable sets.
Summarizing, we state the following correspondences that clarify the terms-classes peras,
apeiron:
1. peras ≡ commensurability ≡ finite anthuphairetic process.
2. apeiron ≡ incommensurability ≡ infinite anthuphairetic process.
Here we must note that the concepts of infinity as described above, as well as the construction
of real numbers (and in particular irrational numbers, which correspond to incommensurable
61 I believe that we should view this just as Plato’s attempt to discern between two types of infinity. In modern
mathematical terms, apeiron in quantity corresponds to countably infinity (with cardinality N0); and apeiron
in degree corresponds to uncountably infinity (with cardinality 2N0). For further analysis see Karasmanis [16],
Anapolitanos [2] and Anapolitanos and Demis [3].
62where qS denotes the complement of a set S.
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magnitudes) impose a certain natural topology on the Real Line63. Within the framework of
this topology the various mathematical notions, especially the concepts of density and conver-
gence, should be understood. This framework provides the appropriate meaning of the various
mathematical notions involved in the formulation of the main Claim and additionally it is the
only possible one consistent with the Mathematics of Plato’s Academy.
Furthermore, the concept of convergence (as apprehended in this Section) was used to argue
in Section 3B that the logics of the TMA and the TBA arguments are not contradictory but
they are rather consistent.
Of course one could naturally ask: Did Plato apprehended all these results? I believe, as
the above analysis showed, that yes, it is highly probable. We have to state that Plato indeed
had a thorough knowledge of the mathematics of his era and especially the philosophical and
foundational problems of it (see Karasmanis [14] and Fowler [11]). Our analysis leads us to
suppose that Plato had a strong grasp on approaching magnitudes in terms of incommensurability
rather than the Zenonian infinite divisibility . Additionally, and in relation to the above, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that Plato comprehended the modern mathematical notion of density
and through it the approach of the continuum as the closure (in the topology described earlier)
of the rational numbers in Real numbers, Q = R64.
5. Conclusion
In this section, summarizing our results, we state the main conclusions of our article.
The increasing infinite sequence of Forms {Fi}
∞
i=0 constructed by repetitive applications of
the TMA shall be understood as a convergent one. Precisely, it converges to the unique F -
Form for a particular predicate in the framework of the topology developed in Section 4. That
63For the construction of the Real Line from the set of Rational numbers and its associate topology we refer
to Rudin [24]. For an alternative but equivalent approach using Cauchy sequences we recommend Moschovakis
[18].
64In Plato’s thought, that associates the incommensurable magnitudes to the irrational numbers (that have
infinite anthuphairesis) and the commensurable magnitudes with rational numbers (that have finite anthuphaire-
sis) and in his approach in apprehending the continuum, we are able to discern the fundamental concepts of the
proof of the following theorem:
‘Every element of the Real Line, and in particular every irrational number, is the limit of a
sequence of rational numbers. That is, ∀x ∈ R, there is a sequence of rational numbers {ri}
∞
i=0,
such that lim
i→+∞
ri = x.’
For a formal proof of the theorem see Rudin [24].
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is lim
i→+∞
Fi = F . In a philosophical level, we could claim that this limit F -Form should be
apprehended as the constant-unchangeable ‘Is’, ‘εἶναι’. As we have seen in Sections 3, 4, the
convergence of the sequence {Fi}
∞
i=0 to F could apprehended as corresponding to the procedure
called genesis eis ousian- ‘γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν’, applied for each predication-Form.
Furthermore, we studied the apparent contradictory aspects of:
1. The appearances of a plurality of Forms (for each predication) that is generated by repet-
itive applications of the TMA (adopting Cohen’s, [6] thesis).
2. The intention of Plato for assuming a unique Form per Predicate in supporting the Unique-
ness thesis (as this is entailed in the TBA et.al).
In this direction, we provided adequate arguments defending the thesis that the logics of the
TMA and the TBA are not contradictory, but rather consistent and mutually complementary.
In doing this, we have also supported that the final-limit F -Form is not committed to NI axiom.
Thus, we showed that the Uniqueness thesis is safeguarded and the Abstraction Principle in
logic is retained.
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